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At various places along the Massachusetts Thrnpike, a lim-
ited access toll road with a speed limit (in most places) of 65 
miles per hour, there are signs cautioning drivers not to back up 
on the turnpike if they have missed their desired exit. These 
signs tell us much about Massachusetts drivers, since in most 
other states we could not imagine the need for such signs, pre-
cisely because we could scarcely imagine the possibility of drivers 
engaging in the behavior that Massachusetts sees a need to warn 
against. 
As they tell us much about Massachusetts drivers, these 
signs also instruct us in constitutional jurisprudence. Like the 
signs on the Thrnpike, constitutional provisions tend to presup-
pose the likelihood of the behavior they prohibit. Just as there 
are no signs on the Thrnpike prohibiting throwing Molotov cock-
tails at other vehicles, so too do we rarely see constitutional pro-
visions addressed to theoretically unpleasant situations factually 
unlikely to occur in the world. And just as the signs on the Thm-
pike prohibit what the sign posters believe is actually likely to 
happen, so too do the drafters of constitutions go out of their 
way to address what they see as genuine threats. 
Yet what is a genuine threat at one time may not be a genu-
ine threat at another. Few students of American history fail to 
understand the perceived need, in 1791, for the Third Amend-
ment, yet for the same reason it is unlikely that the Third 
Amendment would find its way into a constitution newly rewrit-
ten in 1995. That the Fourteenth Amendment makes no mention 
of gender discrimination is historically unsurprising, just as it is 
historically unsurprising that gender discrimination is explicitly 
prohibited in virtually every one of the new constitutions now 
emerging throughout the world. 
From this perspective, the imperfections of the Constitution 
of the United States, in 1995, are likely to be imperfections of 
two types - guarding against problems that no longer exist, and 
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not guarding against problems that exist now but did not exist (or 
were not then perceived as existing) at earlier times. As exam-
ples of the former, we have not only the Third Amendment, 
whose prohibition of a non-problem is relatively costless, but also 
the more costly efforts to guard against dangers now far less ap-
parent, such as the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury in 
civil cases and the Second Amendment right to keep and bear 
arms.l And as examples of the latter, we might quickly think of 
the lack of (textual) protection for the right to privacy or the 
right to be free from discrimination on account of, say, gender or 
sexual orientation. And many people believe (although I am not 
one of them) that the lack of term limits and the lack of a re-
quirement of a balanced budget are perfect examples of the fact 
that the eighteenth century constitution did not anticipate all of 
the threats posed by the twenty-first century United States. 
Yet the biggest question of guarding against what are now 
non-problems and not guarding against what are now problems is 
one not restricted to particular constitutional provisions. Rather, 
the eighteenth century constitution adopts a certain perspective 
about the state itself, not unlike the one that Massachusetts ap-
pears to adopt with respect to the people who are armed with 
automobiles. The eighteenth century constitution is not only a 
Lockean document, but in an important but less direct way a 
Hobbesian one, having as dim a view of concentrations of state 
power as Hobbes had about human nature in general. Whether 
it be the rejection of a parliamentary system in favor of strong 
checks and balances, the existence of numerous requirements of 
supermajorities (as, for example, with the trial of impeachments, 
amending the Constitution, and ratification of treaties), and the 
various side constraints of the Bill of Rights, an underlying 
theme of the Constitution has always been that the dangers of 
mistaken governmental action are more to be feared than the 
dangers of mistaken governmental inaction. To modify Black-
1. Implicit in the statement in the text is my belief that, judicial interpretations 
notwithstanding, the existence of the Second Amendment has legitimated a certain rheto-
ric and politics that have made gun control more difficult than would otherwise have been 
the case. I should note as well that a serious investigation into constitutional imperfection 
would examine with some care the genuine costs of various constitutional provisions. 
Although many parts of the constitution undoubtedly save lives, other parts most likely 
cost them. How many lives have been lost by the Second Amendment? How many by 
the Eighth's non-prohibition of capital punishment? How many by the 1\venty-Ftrst's 
permission (against the background of the Eighteenth) of the manufacture, sale, and 
transportation of intoxicating liquors? Although not all parts of the Constitution can or 
should be evaluated by even a non-quantified cost-benefit analysis, some parts can be, 
and a careful look at constitutional imperfection would try to examine whether the costs 
of some constitutional provisions (or non-provisions) greatly outweigh their benefits. 
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stone's maxim about the criminal law, it appears that the existing 
Constitution is premised on the belief that it is better that ten 
good things go undone than that one bad one be permitted. 
Such a libertarian view of the state may still be appropriate. 
Talk of "gridlock" may be misguided, and now just as in the 
eighteenth century the dangers of government overreaching may 
be far greater than the dangers of government impotence. But 
perhaps not. If knowing what we know about the world and the 
history of this country we were now to redraft the Constitution, 
would we be so concerned with George III, or would we instead 
be more concerned with the problems of government inaction? 
No amount of attention, however appropriate, to individual 
clauses and individual doctrines can transcend the fact that it is 
widely believed in other countries that the degree of distrust of 
government in the United States, a distrust both fostered by and 
reflected in the Constitution, surpasses that of any other country 
on the planet, including many whose populations have far greater 
reason to distrust their government than we have to distrust ours. 
If we are looking for constitutional imperfection, we would be 
better off looking not for various clauses or doctrines that could 
be different, but instead at whether the constitutional structure 
we now have has imperfectly calibrated, in light of the problems 
we now face, the balance between the dangers of erroneous gov-
ernmental empowerment and the dangers of erroneous govern-
mental disempowerment. The overarching theme of the 
Constitution of the United States, and the "who's to say/where 
do you draw the line/thin edge of the wedge/parade of horribles/ 
foot in the door/slippery slope" rhetoric it has engendered, is one 
of fear, a fear that in 1787 and 1791 was properly aimed at the 
state. Yet just as the signs on the Massachusetts Thrnpike would 
be misguided were Massachusetts drivers to become more sensi-
ble, so too would the aim of the eighteenth century Constitution -
governmental tyranny - be misguided if the target had shifted. 
Whether it has is a question both political and empirical. But the 
measure of the imperfection of the Constitution is the extent to 
which the entire Constitution, as written, interpreted, and under-
stood, is aimed at a danger that occupies a different position on 
the spectrum of all dangers than it did two centuries ago. If that 
is the case, then the imperfection of American constitutionalism 
cannot be trivialized by identifying the occasional flaws in this 
clause or that. To pick out a clause or two as imperfect is implic-
itly to endorse the remainder. Whether the remainder, in the 
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large and not in the small, is worthy of endorsement is an issue, 
in an era of constitutional transformation throughout the world, 
that should not easily be ignored. 
